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1663969

registered interest
date	13/10/2023
answering body	Treasury
answering dept id	14
answering dept short name	Treasury
answering dept sort name	Treasury
hansard heading	Business: Coronavirus
house id	1
legislature	25259 pref label House of Commons
question text	To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what steps he is taking with Cabinet colleagues to recover funding awarded fraudulently through the Government's pandemic support schemes.
tabling member constituency	Solihull
tabling member printed	Julian Knight
uin	201822
answer	answer is ministerial correction date of answer 23/10/2023 answer text <p>Our Covid-19 interventions helped millions of people and businesses through the worst effects of the pandemic. The Government prioritised getting money to those who needed it, with the schemes designed to minimise fraud while not unnecessarily delaying payments.</p><p> </p><p>The Government has created the Public Sector Fraud Authority (PSFA), with £24.7 million of new funding in the current SR period to support public bodies and departments to better understand and reduce the impact of fraud.</p><p> </p><p>The Government also invested over £100 million over two years in the Taxpayer Protection Taskforce to combat fraud in the HMRC support schemes. Up to the end of September, HMRC has recovered overpayments or prevented payments being made of claims worth over £1.6 billion. HMRC is still committed to the recovery of Covid-19 support scheme error and fraud.</p><p> </p><p>The Government is also committed to bearing down on fraud in the Covid Loan Schemes. £13.2 million has been allocated to the National Investigation Service over three years to double their investigative capacity on Bounce Back Loans and fund enforcement activity. £10.9 million has been allocated to the British Business Bank over three years to boost their counter fraud and assurance programme.</p><p> </p> answering member constituency Salisbury answering member printed John Glen question first answered 23/10/2023 12:25:58 answering member 4051 label Biography information for John Glen
tabling member	4410 label Biography information for Julian Knight

1488473

registered interest
date	12/07/2022
answering body	Treasury
answering dept id	14
answering dept short name	Treasury
answering dept sort name	Treasury
hansard heading	Business: Coronavirus
house id	1
legislature	25259 pref label House of Commons
question text	To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whether he has met the (a) Taxpayer Protection Taskforce or (b) National Crime Agency to discuss fraud in the covid-19 support schemes since his appointment as Chancellor.
tabling member constituency	Wolverhampton South East
tabling member printed	Pat McFadden
uin	34873
answer	answer is ministerial correction date of answer 19/07/2022 answer text <p>Treasury Ministers and officials regularly engage with the National Crime Agency and Taxpayer Protection Taskforce to discuss shared policy interests, such as the response to fraud.</p><p> </p><p>The Government has invested over £100 million in the Taxpayer Protection Taskforce to combat fraud on the HMRC Covid-19 schemes, one of the largest and quickest responses to a fraud risk by HMRC.</p><p> </p><p>In 2021-22 the Taxpayer Protection Taskforce prevented more than £350 million from being lost through error and fraud in the COVID-19 financial support schemes. Overall, since the start of the schemes, the amount of money either recovered or blocked from being paid out totals more than £1.2 billion, with compliance activity still ongoing.</p> answering member constituency South East Cambridgeshire answering member printed Lucy Frazer question first answered 19/07/2022 15:04:22 answering member 4517 label Biography information for Lucy Frazer
tabling member	1587 label Biography information for Pat McFadden

1462078

registered interest
date	11/05/2022
answering body	Treasury
answering dept id	14
answering dept short name	Treasury
answering dept sort name	Treasury
hansard heading	Business: Coronavirus
house id	1
legislature	25259 pref label House of Commons
question text	To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, how many prosecutions there have been for fraudulent covid-19 business support claims in the last two years.
tabling member constituency	Ellesmere Port and Neston
tabling member printed	Justin Madders
uin	814
answer	answer is ministerial correction date of answer 16/05/2022 answer text At the Spring Budget 2021 the Government announced a £100m investment into a Taxpayer Protection Taskforce to significantly extend Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) work to tackle fraud and error in the COVID-19 support schemes that HMRC administered (Self Employment Income Support Scheme, Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme and Eat Out to Help Out).<p> </p>HMRC designed these schemes to prevent fraud, both in the eligibility criteria and the claim process itself. HMRC also put in place a series of checks on claims before they were paid, so they blocked those that were highly indicative of criminal activity.<p> </p>The Government and HMRC always knew they could be attractive to fraudsters and are taking tough action to tackle fraudulent behaviour. Anyone who keeps grant money despite knowing they were not entitled to it, faces having to repay up to double the amount they received, plus interest and potentially criminal prosecution.<p> </p>To date there have been no prosecutions on the HMRC administered COVID-19 support schemes. However, HMRC has 21 active criminal investigations and the final decision on whether to prosecute in these cases will be made by independent prosecution partners. answering member constituency Salisbury answering member printed John Glen question first answered 16/05/2022 13:45:20 answering member 4051 label Biography information for John Glen
tabling member	4418 label Biography information for Justin Madders

1438644

registered interest
date	07/03/2022
answering body	Treasury
answering dept id	14
answering dept short name	Treasury
answering dept sort name	Treasury
hansard heading	Business: Coronavirus
house id	1
legislature	25259 pref label House of Commons
question text	To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what steps he is taking to recover funds that have been lost to fraud related to covid-19 support schemes.
tabling member constituency	Ynys Môn
tabling member printed	Virginia Crosbie
uin	135713
answer	answer is ministerial correction date of answer 10/03/2022 answer text <p>The Government has consistently stated that fraud is totally unacceptable, and we are taking action on multiple fronts to recover money lost to error and fraud and, where necessary, take legal action on those who have sought to exploit the COVID-19 support schemes.</p><p> </p><p>It was right to establish the schemes quickly and in a way that they could be accessed easily by the millions who needed support. Given the unprecedented efforts that the Government has made to protect jobs and livelihoods during this pandemic, it would have been impossible to prevent all related fraud.</p><p> </p><p>In designing the COVID-19 support schemes the Government followed the leading practice of the International Public Sector Fraud Forum on dealing with fraud in an emergency context. The dedicated Government Counter Fraud Function and Centre of Expertise re-prioritised its work to focus on COVID financial support schemes. It provided fraud risk assessment support, offered expert counter fraud advice and created data driven tools to Government Departments to help prevent, detect and recover fraud. The Fraud Function continues to offer post-event assurance support to Government Departments to find and fight fraud.</p><p> </p><p>Robust measures were put in place to control error and fraud in COVID-19 support schemes from their inception. For instance, to minimise the risk of fraud and error and unverified claims, the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme and Self-Employment Income Support Scheme were designed around existing data held on HMRC’s systems.</p><p> </p><p>To further bolster anti-fraud measures on HMRC-delivered COVID-19 support schemes, at the Spring Budget last year, the Government invested more than £100 million in a Taxpayer Protection Taskforce of more than 1,200 HMRC staff to combat COVID-19-related fraud. This Taskforce is expected to recover between £800 million and £1 billion from fraudulent or incorrect payments during 2021-22 and 2022-23. In addition, HMRC has so far stopped or recovered £743 million of overclaimed grants in 2020/21.</p><p> </p><p>In respect of the Bounce Back Loan Scheme, the Government continues to work closely with the British Business Bank, lenders and enforcement agencies to tackle fraud and to recover as many fraudulent loans as possible. This is on top of the £2.2 billion worth of fraudulent applications that were prevented by upfront checks.</p><p> </p><p>As part of the Spring Budget last year, we announced plans to significantly strengthen enforcement activity against fraudulent Bounce Back Loans, including new powers for the Insolvency Service to tackle rogue directors and investing in the National Investigation Service to investigate serious fraud.</p><p> </p><p>For local authority-administered business grants, local authorities are responsible for ensuring the safe administration of grants and that appropriate measures are put in place to mitigate against the increased risks of both fraud and payment error. Guidance for the grant schemes requires that local authorities have assurance plans in place which set out the steps they would take to minimise fraud. Government has mandated pre-payment checks (company and bank account searches) as well as post-event assurance, and a Fraud Risk Assessment.</p><p> </p><p>Where grants have been paid in error, non-compliantly or to a fraudster, local authorities must seek to recover these funds and return them to BEIS. If local authorities have been unable to reclaim the grant, the case may be referred to BEIS under the Debt Recovery Policy to establish the next steps.</p> answering member constituency Salisbury answering member printed John Glen question first answered 10/03/2022 15:46:15 answering member 4051 label Biography information for John Glen
tabling member	4859 label Biography information for Virginia Crosbie

1437714

registered interest
date	03/03/2022
answering body	Treasury
answering dept id	14
answering dept short name	Treasury
answering dept sort name	Treasury
hansard heading	Business: Coronavirus
house id	1
legislature	25259 pref label House of Commons
question text	To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what steps he is taking to ensure that organisations that received covid-19 loans repay a fair amount of the funding they received.
tabling member constituency	Strangford
tabling member printed	Jim Shannon
uin	134007
answer	answer is ministerial correction date of answer 14/03/2022 answer text <p>We have been clear from the outset that these are loans which must be repaid.</p><p> </p><p>In order to give businesses who have borrowed under the Bounce Back Loan Scheme further support and flexibility in making their repayments, the Chancellor announced “Pay as You Grow” (PAYG) options in September 2020. These give businesses the option to take a a six month full repayment holiday, and to extend their Bounce Back Loan repayments over ten years, reducing their average monthly repayments on the loan by almost half. Businesses also have the option to move to interest-only payments for periods of up to six months (an option which they can use up to three times).</p><p> </p><p>For those who borrowed under the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS), the Government has taken action to allow lenders to provide borrowers with more time to make their repayments where they assess that borrowers are in difficulty and will benefit from the extension.</p><p> </p><p>While it is too early to give a definitive view on the final level of payments, current levels of failure to repay are lower than some of the worst-case scenarios cited by critics: early data shows that businesses have made a positive start to repayments, with the significant majority of businesses meeting monthly repayments. A proportion of businesses have chosen to repay their loan in full already and current levels of distress amongst borrowers are relatively low.</p><p> </p><p>The latest publicly available data can be found here: https://www.british-business-bank.co.uk/covid-19-emergency-loan-schemes-repayment-data/.</p> answering member constituency Salisbury answering member printed John Glen question first answered 14/03/2022 15:04:33 answering member 4051 label Biography information for John Glen
tabling member	4131 label Biography information for Jim Shannon

1421825

registered interest
date	10/02/2022
answering body	Treasury
answering dept id	14
answering dept short name	Treasury
answering dept sort name	Treasury
hansard heading	Business: Coronavirus
house id	1
legislature	25259 pref label House of Commons
question text	To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what estimate his Department has made of the number of applications to the (a) Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, (b) Self-Employment Income Support Scheme, (c) Eat out to Help Out, (d) Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme, (e) Bounce Back Loan Scheme and (f) Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme that were submitted with erroneous registration data; and how many and what proportion of those applications involve fraud.
tabling member constituency	Glasgow Central
tabling member printed	Alison Thewliss
uin	122712
answer	answer is ministerial correction date of answer 21/02/2022 answer text <p>The Government has provided around £400 billion of direct support for the economy since the start of the pandemic, which has helped to safeguard jobs, businesses and public services in every region and nation of the UK.</p><p>The Government takes the issue of potential fraud relating to covid support schemes extremely seriously. Robust measures were put in place to control error and fraud in the key covid support schemes from their inception.</p><p> </p><p>Departments are required to disclose details of material fraud, evasion and error within their annual report and accounts, which can be found on GOV.UK. From 2021-22, departments must provide an evidenced estimate of the level of fraud and error specifically in respect of the COVID-19 related schemes they administer and the level of debt as a result of that fraud and error.</p><p> </p><p>In relation to the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS), HMRC prioritised getting money to those who needed it with the schemes designed to minimise fraud while not unnecessarily delaying payments. The schemes were designed to prevent fraud, both in the eligibility criteria and the claim process itself.</p><p> </p><p>As recovering funds lost to organised criminals is especially difficult, HMRC prioritised tackling this risk before payments were made. Eligibility has been limited to employees and the self-employed who already had a tax footprint, which gives HMRC greater confidence these are not ‘bogus’ claims falsified to look like real businesses. HMRC also put in place a series of checks on claims before they are paid so that HMRC were able to block those that are highly indicative of criminal activity. In addition, HMRC is able to investigate suspect payments that did not meet the threshold for pre-payment blocks post-payment, using their full range of civil and criminal powers and tools.</p><p> </p><p>In relation to the CJRS specifically, HMRC ensured that the claims service captured all the data necessary to enable post payment compliance and only accepted claims from employers known to and authenticated by HMRC. HMRC have actively prevented non-eligible employers from applying. Claimants are required to provide details of who has been furloughed and for how long, providing HMRC with clear data against which to make checks.</p><p> </p><p>Regarding the SEISS, claimants had to have made a 2018/19 self-assessment tax return in order to claim grants 1 to 3 and a 2019/20 tax return to claim grants 4 and 5. The amount they claim is based on tax returns previously submitted to HMRC. In addition, compliance activity is underway in respect of those claimants who have indicated on their tax returns that their self-employment has ceased, but claimed a SEISS grant. If HMRC identify grants have been claimed when the person is not eligible, then recovery of the overpaid amounts is undertaken, with appropriate penalties being issued to those most egregious of cases. HMRC have also implemented pre-claim verification checks on those customers who have submitted 2019/20 returns as newly self-employed. The purpose of these checks is to establish that the return is from a genuine person, and they are undertaking self-employed activity.</p><p> </p><p>Eat Out to Help Out ran for one month in August 2020. HMRC’s risk analysis identified customers whose claims indicated significantly supressed turnover and/or an inflated claim. HMRC launched a campaign aimed at encouraging these customers to repay excess claims (although where HMRC believe something is clearly egregious, they move straight to direct intervention). Customers who presented a risk following this campaign were triaged for further activity. HMRC also directly investigated around 800 of the highest risk cases.</p><p> </p><p>Regarding Bounce Back Loans (BBLS), lenders were required to make and maintain appropriate anti-fraud, anti-money laundering and Know Your Customer checks. Specifically, lenders must use a reputable fraud bureau (such as The UK’s Fraud Prevention Community CIFAS’s fraud prevention and detection solution SIRA) to screen against potential or known fraudsters. If an application fails the lender’s fraud checks, the lender must not offer a loan.</p><p> </p><p>In addition to these lender checks, further checks include the duplicate loan check, incorporation date check and the change in director check that were introduced in June 2020. These minimum standards were agreed following consultation with PWC and lenders on what would have the biggest impact on preventing fraud while still meeting the policy objectives.</p><p> </p><p>Under the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS) and the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CLBILS), lenders were able to conduct full credit checks on borrowers in line with business as usual processes and thus verify the financial information provided by borrowers, with less reliance on information self-certified by the borrower (as is the case under BBLS). This reduces fraud risk by allowing lenders to assure themselves that borrowers are not providing false information in order to obtain funds.</p> answering member constituency Salisbury answering member printed John Glen grouped question UIN 122713 122714 question first answered 21/02/2022 16:53:25 answering member 4051 label Biography information for John Glen
tabling member	4430 label Biography information for Alison Thewliss

1421826

registered interest
date	10/02/2022
answering body	Treasury
answering dept id	14
answering dept short name	Treasury
answering dept sort name	Treasury
hansard heading	Business: Coronavirus
house id	1
legislature	25259 pref label House of Commons
question text	To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, how many and what proportion of applications to the (a) Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, (b) Self-Employment Income Support Scheme, (c) Eat out to Help Out, (d) Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme, (e) Bounce Back Loan Scheme and (f) Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme that were submitted with erroneous registration data has his Department identified as involving fraud.
tabling member constituency	Glasgow Central
tabling member printed	Alison Thewliss
uin	122713
answer	answer is ministerial correction date of answer 21/02/2022 answer text <p>The Government has provided around £400 billion of direct support for the economy since the start of the pandemic, which has helped to safeguard jobs, businesses and public services in every region and nation of the UK.</p><p>The Government takes the issue of potential fraud relating to covid support schemes extremely seriously. Robust measures were put in place to control error and fraud in the key covid support schemes from their inception.</p><p> </p><p>Departments are required to disclose details of material fraud, evasion and error within their annual report and accounts, which can be found on GOV.UK. From 2021-22, departments must provide an evidenced estimate of the level of fraud and error specifically in respect of the COVID-19 related schemes they administer and the level of debt as a result of that fraud and error.</p><p> </p><p>In relation to the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS), HMRC prioritised getting money to those who needed it with the schemes designed to minimise fraud while not unnecessarily delaying payments. The schemes were designed to prevent fraud, both in the eligibility criteria and the claim process itself.</p><p> </p><p>As recovering funds lost to organised criminals is especially difficult, HMRC prioritised tackling this risk before payments were made. Eligibility has been limited to employees and the self-employed who already had a tax footprint, which gives HMRC greater confidence these are not ‘bogus’ claims falsified to look like real businesses. HMRC also put in place a series of checks on claims before they are paid so that HMRC were able to block those that are highly indicative of criminal activity. In addition, HMRC is able to investigate suspect payments that did not meet the threshold for pre-payment blocks post-payment, using their full range of civil and criminal powers and tools.</p><p> </p><p>In relation to the CJRS specifically, HMRC ensured that the claims service captured all the data necessary to enable post payment compliance and only accepted claims from employers known to and authenticated by HMRC. HMRC have actively prevented non-eligible employers from applying. Claimants are required to provide details of who has been furloughed and for how long, providing HMRC with clear data against which to make checks.</p><p> </p><p>Regarding the SEISS, claimants had to have made a 2018/19 self-assessment tax return in order to claim grants 1 to 3 and a 2019/20 tax return to claim grants 4 and 5. The amount they claim is based on tax returns previously submitted to HMRC. In addition, compliance activity is underway in respect of those claimants who have indicated on their tax returns that their self-employment has ceased, but claimed a SEISS grant. If HMRC identify grants have been claimed when the person is not eligible, then recovery of the overpaid amounts is undertaken, with appropriate penalties being issued to those most egregious of cases. HMRC have also implemented pre-claim verification checks on those customers who have submitted 2019/20 returns as newly self-employed. The purpose of these checks is to establish that the return is from a genuine person, and they are undertaking self-employed activity.</p><p> </p><p>Eat Out to Help Out ran for one month in August 2020. HMRC’s risk analysis identified customers whose claims indicated significantly supressed turnover and/or an inflated claim. HMRC launched a campaign aimed at encouraging these customers to repay excess claims (although where HMRC believe something is clearly egregious, they move straight to direct intervention). Customers who presented a risk following this campaign were triaged for further activity. HMRC also directly investigated around 800 of the highest risk cases.</p><p> </p><p>Regarding Bounce Back Loans (BBLS), lenders were required to make and maintain appropriate anti-fraud, anti-money laundering and Know Your Customer checks. Specifically, lenders must use a reputable fraud bureau (such as The UK’s Fraud Prevention Community CIFAS’s fraud prevention and detection solution SIRA) to screen against potential or known fraudsters. If an application fails the lender’s fraud checks, the lender must not offer a loan.</p><p> </p><p>In addition to these lender checks, further checks include the duplicate loan check, incorporation date check and the change in director check that were introduced in June 2020. These minimum standards were agreed following consultation with PWC and lenders on what would have the biggest impact on preventing fraud while still meeting the policy objectives.</p><p> </p><p>Under the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS) and the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CLBILS), lenders were able to conduct full credit checks on borrowers in line with business as usual processes and thus verify the financial information provided by borrowers, with less reliance on information self-certified by the borrower (as is the case under BBLS). This reduces fraud risk by allowing lenders to assure themselves that borrowers are not providing false information in order to obtain funds.</p> answering member constituency Salisbury answering member printed John Glen grouped question UIN 122712 122714 question first answered 21/02/2022 16:53:25 answering member 4051 label Biography information for John Glen
tabling member	4430 label Biography information for Alison Thewliss

1421827

registered interest
date	10/02/2022
answering body	Treasury
answering dept id	14
answering dept short name	Treasury
answering dept sort name	Treasury
hansard heading	Business: Coronavirus
house id	1
legislature	25259 pref label House of Commons
question text	To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what assessment his Department has made of the impact of erroneous registration data on its ability to recover payments from fraudulent applications to covid-19 support schemes.
tabling member constituency	Glasgow Central
tabling member printed	Alison Thewliss
uin	122714
answer	answer is ministerial correction date of answer 21/02/2022 answer text <p>The Government has provided around £400 billion of direct support for the economy since the start of the pandemic, which has helped to safeguard jobs, businesses and public services in every region and nation of the UK.</p><p>The Government takes the issue of potential fraud relating to covid support schemes extremely seriously. Robust measures were put in place to control error and fraud in the key covid support schemes from their inception.</p><p> </p><p>Departments are required to disclose details of material fraud, evasion and error within their annual report and accounts, which can be found on GOV.UK. From 2021-22, departments must provide an evidenced estimate of the level of fraud and error specifically in respect of the COVID-19 related schemes they administer and the level of debt as a result of that fraud and error.</p><p> </p><p>In relation to the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS), HMRC prioritised getting money to those who needed it with the schemes designed to minimise fraud while not unnecessarily delaying payments. The schemes were designed to prevent fraud, both in the eligibility criteria and the claim process itself.</p><p> </p><p>As recovering funds lost to organised criminals is especially difficult, HMRC prioritised tackling this risk before payments were made. Eligibility has been limited to employees and the self-employed who already had a tax footprint, which gives HMRC greater confidence these are not ‘bogus’ claims falsified to look like real businesses. HMRC also put in place a series of checks on claims before they are paid so that HMRC were able to block those that are highly indicative of criminal activity. In addition, HMRC is able to investigate suspect payments that did not meet the threshold for pre-payment blocks post-payment, using their full range of civil and criminal powers and tools.</p><p> </p><p>In relation to the CJRS specifically, HMRC ensured that the claims service captured all the data necessary to enable post payment compliance and only accepted claims from employers known to and authenticated by HMRC. HMRC have actively prevented non-eligible employers from applying. Claimants are required to provide details of who has been furloughed and for how long, providing HMRC with clear data against which to make checks.</p><p> </p><p>Regarding the SEISS, claimants had to have made a 2018/19 self-assessment tax return in order to claim grants 1 to 3 and a 2019/20 tax return to claim grants 4 and 5. The amount they claim is based on tax returns previously submitted to HMRC. In addition, compliance activity is underway in respect of those claimants who have indicated on their tax returns that their self-employment has ceased, but claimed a SEISS grant. If HMRC identify grants have been claimed when the person is not eligible, then recovery of the overpaid amounts is undertaken, with appropriate penalties being issued to those most egregious of cases. HMRC have also implemented pre-claim verification checks on those customers who have submitted 2019/20 returns as newly self-employed. The purpose of these checks is to establish that the return is from a genuine person, and they are undertaking self-employed activity.</p><p> </p><p>Eat Out to Help Out ran for one month in August 2020. HMRC’s risk analysis identified customers whose claims indicated significantly supressed turnover and/or an inflated claim. HMRC launched a campaign aimed at encouraging these customers to repay excess claims (although where HMRC believe something is clearly egregious, they move straight to direct intervention). Customers who presented a risk following this campaign were triaged for further activity. HMRC also directly investigated around 800 of the highest risk cases.</p><p> </p><p>Regarding Bounce Back Loans (BBLS), lenders were required to make and maintain appropriate anti-fraud, anti-money laundering and Know Your Customer checks. Specifically, lenders must use a reputable fraud bureau (such as The UK’s Fraud Prevention Community CIFAS’s fraud prevention and detection solution SIRA) to screen against potential or known fraudsters. If an application fails the lender’s fraud checks, the lender must not offer a loan.</p><p> </p><p>In addition to these lender checks, further checks include the duplicate loan check, incorporation date check and the change in director check that were introduced in June 2020. These minimum standards were agreed following consultation with PWC and lenders on what would have the biggest impact on preventing fraud while still meeting the policy objectives.</p><p> </p><p>Under the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS) and the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CLBILS), lenders were able to conduct full credit checks on borrowers in line with business as usual processes and thus verify the financial information provided by borrowers, with less reliance on information self-certified by the borrower (as is the case under BBLS). This reduces fraud risk by allowing lenders to assure themselves that borrowers are not providing false information in order to obtain funds.</p> answering member constituency Salisbury answering member printed John Glen grouped question UIN 122712 122713 question first answered 21/02/2022 16:53:25 answering member 4051 label Biography information for John Glen
tabling member	4430 label Biography information for Alison Thewliss

1421157

registered interest
date	09/02/2022
answering body	Treasury
answering dept id	14
answering dept short name	Treasury
answering dept sort name	Treasury
hansard heading	Business: Coronavirus
house id	1
legislature	25259 pref label House of Commons
question text	To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what comparative assessment he has made of the equity of his policies on the recovery of fraudulently claimed covid-19 support funds and the pursuance of the retrospective loan charge.
tabling member constituency	Falkirk
tabling member printed	John McNally
uin	121805
answer	answer is ministerial correction date of answer 22/02/2022 answer text <p>The Covid-19 support funds and the Loan Charge are two distinct polices.</p><p>In relation to the Covid-19 support funds, throughout the pandemic, the Government’s number one priority has been to protect jobs and livelihoods while also supporting businesses and public services across the UK.</p><p>The overwhelming majority of people that claimed Covid-19 support did so legitimately. However, HMRC are aware that mistakes can happen, which is why they are supporting people who made a mistake to correct it. Those who keep money claimed from any of the Covid-19 support schemes despite knowing they were not entitled to it face having to repay up to double the amount they received, plus interest, and potentially criminal prosecution in the most serious of cases.</p><p>The Loan Charge was announced at Budget 2016 and was a new tax charge on disguised remuneration loan balances outstanding on 5 April 2019. The Government recognises the Loan Charge can have a significant impact. Anyone who is worried about being able to pay their Loan Charge liability should contact HMRC. They may be able to agree an instalment arrangement based on their financial circumstances.</p><p>No comparative assessment of the recovery of Covid-19 support and liabilities related to the Loan Charge has been made, as they are not directly comparable.</p> answering member constituency South East Cambridgeshire answering member printed Lucy Frazer question first answered 22/02/2022 15:49:44 answering member 4517 label Biography information for Lucy Frazer
tabling member	4424 label Biography information for John McNally

1421267

registered interest
date	09/02/2022
answering body	Treasury
answering dept id	14
answering dept short name	Treasury
answering dept sort name	Treasury
hansard heading	Business: Coronavirus
house id	1
legislature	25259 pref label House of Commons
question text	To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what meetings Ministers and officials in his Department held with stakeholders on the £4.3 million lost to fraudulent covid-19 claims; and who was in attendance at those meetings.
tabling member constituency	Ellesmere Port and Neston
tabling member printed	Justin Madders
uin	121804
answer	answer is ministerial correction date of answer 23/02/2022 answer text <p>The £4.3 billion figure that has been widely reported is not a figure produced or recognised by HMRC or HMT. HM Treasury works closely with HMRC to ensure a robust approach to error and fraud within the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, the Self-Employment Income Support Scheme, and Eat Out to Help Out, and the Government remains committed to cracking down on fraud wherever it arises.</p><p> </p><p>Within the unprecedented £400 billion package of support, the Government put robust measures in place to control error and fraud in the key pandemic support schemes. By building automated controls into the digital claim process, HMRC prevented more than 100,000 ineligible or mistaken claims in these schemes. At the March 2021 Budget, the Government invested over £100 million in a Taxpayer Protection Taskforce. The taskforce is expected to recover £800 million to £1 billion from fraudulent or incorrect payments over the next two years. This is in addition to the £536 million already recovered by HMRC in 2020-21. After this point, HMRC will continue to address fraud in the schemes through wider compliance activity.</p><p> </p><p>The Government designed these schemes to prevent as much fraud as possible before any payments were made, while still supporting those who needed it as quickly as possible in unprecedented circumstances. As a result, the economy is back to pre-pandemic levels and growing at the fastest rate in the G7.</p> answering member constituency South East Cambridgeshire answering member printed Lucy Frazer question first answered 23/02/2022 17:07:40 answering member 4517 label Biography information for Lucy Frazer
tabling member	4418 label Biography information for Justin Madders